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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jesse Ray Still appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence found in his car after
a police officer stopped him for a traffic violation. Mr. Still claims the officer prolonged his
detention, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, when the officer deviated from the purpose of
the traffic stop to make a call to request a K-9 unit, before running his license check and
registration verification. The State, below, offered no alternative reason for the period of delay
but asserted that the deviation was a “de minimis thing,” and because the officer got right back to
work, there was no Fourth Amendment violation. The district court came up with its own
hypothesis to justify that period of delay: the district court found that, “during that time [the
second officer] Kingery was entering the vehicle, being seated, and as the call concluded, both
officers began working as a unit to run and review the status of Still’s license and registration.”
(R., p.126.) On that basis, the district court concluded the officer’s call to a K-9 unit did not
prolong the stop.
Mr. Still argues the State failed to carry its burden to show the duration of the stop was
justified, and that the district court’s contrary factual findings are clearly erroneous and its legal
conclusions are inconsistent with controlling precedent.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s assertion that the district court’s
factual findings support its conclusion of no prolonging, and to distinguish the two Court of
Appeals’ decisions cited by the State, State v. Renteria, 163 Idaho 545 (Ct. App. 2018) and
State v. McGraw, 163, 736 (Ct. App. 2018), (Resp.Br. pp. 13-17).
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Still’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are incorporated
herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Still’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Still’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Officer Clark’s Call Prolonged The Traffic Stop And The District Court’s Express
Factual Findings Fail To Support Its Contrary Conclusion
As recognized by the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court, “an

officer always has to be reasonably diligent,” and “[i]f an officer can complete traffic based
inquiries expeditiously, then that is the amount of time reasonably required to complete the
stop’s mission.”

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1616 (2015).

Ultimately, if an officer makes unrelated inquiries or investigations, the officer “will inevitably
lengthen the time,” prolonging the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 135
S.Ct. at 1616; State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608 (2016). This rule “applies to all extensions of
traffic stops including those that could reasonably be considered de minimis.” Linze, 161 Idaho
at 608 (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. at 1615-16).
In the present case, the district court found that Officer Clark made a call to a K-9 unit
requesting a drug dog after he was seated in his patrol car and before he began running the
license and registration checks.

(R., pp.125-26.)

However, the district court erroneously

concluded that Officer Clark’s call to the K-9 unit did not prolong the traffic stop. (R., pp.12526.) To support its conclusion, the district court cited to the facts that (1) a second officer,
Reserve Officer Kingery, was entering the patrol car while Officer Clark was on the call, and (2)
that “after the call concluded, both officers began working as a unit to run and review the status
of Still’s license and registration.” (R., p.126 (emphasis added).)
Contrary to the State’s assertion, (see Resp. Br., p.10), the district court’s finding that the
two officers diligently pursued the stop’s purpose after Officer Clark completed his K-9 call,
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does not support the conclusion that the call did not prolong the stop. The district court’s factual
findings are incomplete and fail to support its conclusion that the call did not prolong the stop.
Critically, the district court did not find, nor is there any evidence to show, that Officer
Clark had completed his call at or before the time Kingery was seated. (See R., pp.125-26l; see
generally, Tr.) To the contrary, and as set forth in the Appellant’s Brief, at page 13, the
undisputed video evidence establishes that Officer Clark remained on the K-9 call even after
Kingery was fully seated, and that Kingery was, in fact waiting on Officer Clark to complete his
K-9 call. (Ex., 2:25-35.) Based on this undisputed evidence, it was Officer Clark’s K-9 call –
and not the fact of Kingery seating himself – that delayed the beginning of the license and
registration checks. Under the controlling precedent, even if the delay was brief, it amounted to
an unacceptable intrusion in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616;
State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608 (2016).
Additionally, even if the evidence had supported a finding that Officer Clark had delayed
the license checks in order to wait for Kingery, there still is no basis in record to show or explain
that waiting for Kingery complied with Officer Clark’s duty to diligently and expeditiously
pursue the completion of the stop. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. (See generally, Tr.) The fact
Kingery was entering the patrol car somewhat contemporaneously with Officer Clark’s call is
not a fact that justifies the delay. As argued in Appellant’s Brief, at page 12, Officer Clark had
control of Mr. Still’s license and registration documents, and Officer Clark was in control of the
patrol car’s computer and radio. (See generally, Ex.0:01-10:00.) All of the activities necessary
for conducing the license check were within the control of Officer Clark. (See generally,
Ex.0:01-10:00.) The State offered no reason why Officer Clark did not begin the license checks,
other than because he was making the call to request the drug dog; and Officer Clark himself
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testified that he was doing nothing else during the time of that call. Thus, the district court’s
findings regarding Kingery do not support its conclusion that the time Officer Clark took to call
for the drug dog did not prolong the traffic stop.
B.

The State’s Reliance On State v. Renteria And State v. McGraw Is Misplaced
Contrary to the State’s assertions (Resp. Br., pp.13-17), the Court of Appeals’ holdings in

State v. Renteria, 163 Idaho 545 (Ct. App. 2018) and State v. McGraw, 163, 736
(Ct. App. 2018), (Resp.Br. pp.13-17) do not apply to the facts of this case.
In Renteria, the Court of Appeals considered whether an officer had prolonged the traffic
stop when the officer engaged in three distinct activities that were unrelated to the initial purpose
of the traffic stop: (1) asking the driver whether there were drugs in the vehicle; (2) requesting
the assistance of a canine officer; and (3) discussing his suspicions of drug activity with the
canine officer. 163 Idaho at 548. The Court agreed that all three of these activities were
“unrelated to” the initial purpose of the traffic stop, but concluded that none had extended the
length of the stop.
With respect to the first instance, the Court concluded that asking the driver whether
there were drugs did not extend the stop “because Renteria [the driver] was still in the process of
searching for proof of insurance with the officer posed the question.” Id. at 459; Addressing the
second instance, the Court likewise concluded that requesting the assistance of a canine officer
did not extend the stop because the officer made the request “while walking” back to his patrol
car to generate a ticket for lack of proof of insurance, and therefore did not add time to the stop.
Id.

Then, turning to the third instance, the Court again concluded the officer’s unrelated

discussions with the canine unit did not extend the stop because the officer was still in his patrol
car “awaiting a response from dispatch” regarding the licensing and warrants checks. Id.
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In each of the three instances presented in Renteria, the officer made his unrelated
inquiry while simultaneously engaged in – and without interrupting – tasks related to the mission
of the traffic stop. Id. In Mr. Still’s case, by contrast, Officer Clark had already obtained
Mr. Still’s documents, and had already arrived back at and was seated in his patrol car when,
instead of beginning to run the license checks – or warrants checks or any other checks related to
the mission of the traffic stop – the first thing he did was call the K-9 unit officer. (R., pp.96-97;
Tr., p.17, L.8 – p.18, L.12.) Also distinct from the facts in Renteria, Officer Clark confirmed
that during his call to request a drug dog, he was not “doing anything else.” (Tr., p.16, Ls.9-11.)
For these reasons, the Renteria’s holdings are in applicable here.
The Court of Appeals’ holding in State v. McGraw, 163 Idaho 736, is likewise
inapplicable to Mr. Still’s case. In McGraw, a traffic stop case, the officer (“Officer One”)
handed off his ticket book to a second officer (“Officer Two”) to write the citation while he,
Officer One, deployed his dog. Id. While writing the citation, Officer Two also provided cover
for Officer One. Id. The trial court concluded that Officer One had abandoned the stop and that
because Officer Two was covering for him, the stop was unlawfully prolonged. Id., at 738. The
Court of Appeals reversed. Id. at 736.
The Court of Appeals concluded there was no unlawful extension of the stop. Id. at 740.
The Court explained that, while Officer One had personally abandoned the purpose of the traffic
stop to conduct the dog sniff, there was “no added time” to the stop “because the duties related
[to the stop] were transferred from Officer One to Officer Two before conducting” the unrelated
dog sniff. Id. at 740 (emphasis added). The Court also concluded that writing the citation
“while” at the same time providing cover did not amount to an unlawful extension of the traffic
stop. Id. at 741.
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In contrast to the facts in McGraw, in this case there was no transfer of duties to Kingery
before Officer Clark deviated from the purpose of the traffic stop, and in contrast to McGraw,
there is no showing that Kingery was diligently pursuing tasks related to the traffic stop while
Officer Clark was on the call requesting the drug dog. Rather, Officer Clark deviated from the
original purpose of the traffic stop when he made the K-9 call, and only after he completed that
call did he and Kingery resume the tasks related to the traffic stop. Unlike in McGraw, Officer
Clark did not relinquish nor assign those tasks to Kingery.
Officer Clark’s call to the K-9 unit to request a drug dog prolonged the traffic stop, in
violation of Mr. Still’s Fourth Amendment rights. Suppression should have been granted.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Still respectfully asks
this Court to reverse the district court’s denial of his suppression motion, to vacate his judgment
of conviction, and to remand his case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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